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I. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
DALE E. BENNETT*
A. CRIMINAL LAW
Louisiana's enactment of the Criminal Code of 19421 places
this state well in the fore in the field of substantive criminal law.
It is now possible to ascertain the law without poring over and
comparing a cumbersome mass of overlapping and not too clear
statutory enactments; and lawyers in the civil law State of Lou-
isiana are no longer required to resort to the common law of
England for a definition of such important crimes as murder,
manslaughter, and rape. At the time of its enactment, however,
the new and modernized Criminal Code was viewed with mis-
givings by some members of the Bar. It meant additional work
for the veteran criminal lawyer and for the judge. The experi-
enced practitioner who had mastered the intricacies and obtuse
distinctions of the old common law statutory system lost the
advantage which went with his special training. He must study
the new Code along with the novice fresh out of law school. Dis-
trict attorneys and judges, whose files included memoranda and
the charges on all of the more important crimes, must now rework
those charges and adjust them to the changed nature of the of-
fenses. Even the most careful draftsmanship could not preclude
some nice questions of construction which must ultimately be
decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The general attitude of
the Bench and Bar, however, was to welcome unselfishly the im-
provement of Louisiana's substantive criminal law, and to buckle
down to the immediate problem of a correct and understanding
interpretation of the various provisions of the new Code. It is
significant to note that only seven cases directly involving an
application of articles of the Criminal Code were presented to the
* Acting Dean of the Law School and Associate Professor of Law, Lou-
isiana State University.
1. L1. Act 43 of 1942.
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Louisiana Supreme Court during the 1943-44 term, and these
were easily disposed of. No questions arose concerning the assault
and battery artiqles-an area of the law which had given Lou-
isiana courts considerable difficulty in the past.2
Criminal Code Declared Constitutional
The recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision in State v.
Pete8 unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the Criminal
Code of 1942. This decision is of special importance in that it
shows judicial approval and understanding of improved modern
methods of legislative draftsmanship. Counsel for the appellant
had argued that the new Criminal Code was unconstitutional on
the grounds that it embraced more than one object and that the
title was not sufficiently indicative of its subject matter. Similar
objections have been raised as to other efforts at improved legis-
lation such as.the Uniform Business Corporations Act of 1928 and
the Uniform Narcotics Act of 1934. As it had in those previous in-
stances, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to adopt a restric-
tive interpretation of the constitutional requirement that "Every
law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and
shall have a title indicative of such object.' 4 The court pointed out
that the object of Act 43 of 1942 was a single one, the adoption of
a code of substantive criminal law for the State of Louisiana, and
necessarily comprehended the definition of various crimes and
fixing the penalties for violation thereof. In its definitive handling
of the point concerning the adequacy of the concise title adopted
for the Criminal Code, i.e., "To adopt a Criminal Code for the
State of Louisiana; defining certain crimes, and fixing penalties for
the violation thereof . . .," the supreme court completely laid at
rest the erroneous, but somewhat prevalent, legislative theory
that the title to Louisiana statutes must contain a detailed enu-
meration or synopsis of all items included in the statute.
Homicide-Responsive Verdicts
Criminal homicide, as set out in the new Criminal Code, is of
three grades: murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide.8 The
2. For example, see Work of the Louisiana Supreme Courtfor the 1937-
1938 Term (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 314, 372-374.
3. 206 La. 1078, 20 So. (2) 368 (1944) discussed (1944) 6 LOUISIANA LAW
REvw 72, 77.
4. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 16.
5. See Constitutional Limitations Upon Statute Titles in Louisiana (1944)
6 LoUISIANA LAW RivIEw 72.
6. Art. 29, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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offense is graded according to the circumstances of the case and
the intent of the killer. For example, an intentional killing is
murder.7 Where the offender commits an intentional homicide in
the heat of sudden passion, induced by a sufficient provocation,
the crime is reduced to manslaughter.8 Where the homicide is
unintentional but is a result of criminal negligence the offender
is chargeable with negligent homicide.9 In the case of State v.
Stanford,1 Mr. Justice Higgins, speaking for a unanimous court,
held that a verdict of "guilty of negligent homicide" was respon-
sive to a charge of manslaughter. He pointed out that murder,
manslaughter and negligent homicide were generic offenses and
that it was the legislative intent that negligent homicide should
be included in murder and manslaughter as a lesser offense. The
court overruled defense counsel's argument that the accused had
not been fully informed as to the nature of the accusation against
him," pointing out that the defendant knew, by virtue of the
amended Article 386 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Proce-
dure12 and Article 518 of the Criminal Code, that when he was
charged with the crime of manslaughter the jury was authorized
to return a verdict of the lesser crime of negligent homicide.",
Consistent with its reasoning in the Stanford case, the su-
preme court held, in State v. Harper'15 that a verdict of "attempted
manslaughter" was responsive to an indictment for "attempt to
murder." The defendant had urged that there was no such crime
as "attempted manslaughter" since a specific intent was an essen-
tial element in any "attempt."'" The court correctly pointed out.
7. Art. 30, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
8. Art. 31 (1), La. Crim. Code of 1942.
9. Art. 32, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
10. 204 La. 439, 15 So. (2d) 817 (1943). Accord: State v. Iseringhausen, 204
La. 593, 606, 16 So. (2d) 65, 69 (1943).
11. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I § 10, provides in part that "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him; . . ."
12. "Whenever the indictment sets out an offense including other offenses
of less magnitude or grade, the judge shall charge the jury the law applicable
to all offenses of which the accused could be found guilty under the indict-
ment, and in all trials for murder the jury shall be instructed that they may
find the accused guilty of manslaughter or negligent homicide."
13. "An offender who commits an offense which Includes all the elements
of other lesser offenses, may be prosecuted for and convicted of either the
greater offense or one of the lesser and included offenses. In such case, where
the offender is prosecuted for the greater offense, he may be convicted of any
one of the lesser and included offenses."
14. Accord: State v. Iseringhausen, 204 La. 593, 607, 16 So. (2d) 64, 69
(1943).
15. 205 La. 228, 17 So. (2d) 260 (1944), noted in (1944) 18 Tulane L. Rev.
639, 640.
16. Art. 27, La. Crim. Code of 1942, defines attempt so as to require "a
specific intent" to commit a crime.
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that voluntary manslaughter was an intentional wrong and that
the defendant could, therefore, be found guilty of an attempt to
commit that crime. The court's reasoning in referring to Clark
and Marshall on Crimes, wherein manslaughter is distinguished
from murder by the presence or absence of "malice aforethought,"
is somewhat misleading. The definition of murder in the Criminal
Code 7 does not include the traditional common law requirement
of "malice aforethought, or implied." The redactors' comment
points out that, "This expression means nothing in itself apart
from the decisions which interpret it. As a matter of fact, neither
'malice' nor 'aforethought,' according to the generally accepted
meanings of those terms, is necessary for the crime of murder."18
The actual decision in the Harper case, however, can be fully
justified by careful examination of the manslaughter article.19
Subdivision (1) of that article corresponds to the common law
offense of voluntary manslaughter. It contemplates an intentional
killing which would be murder but for the fact that the offense
is committed in the sudden heat of passion immediately caused by
provocation sufficient to deprive the average person of his self
control. Since manslaughter, as well as murder, may be inten-
tional, an offender may be guilty of attempt to commit either of
those crimes. It is significant to note, however, that an offender
could not be found guilty of "attempted negligent homicide."
Negligent homicide is by the very definition of the offense an un-
intentional killing where liability is based upon criminal negli-
gence.2 0
Murder embraces all the elements of, and includes, the lesser
criminal homicide of manslaughter. Thus, it is no defense for an
offender charged with manslaughter to urge that he is really
guilty of the more serious crime of murder. In State v. Walker,2'
a manslaughter prosecution, it was held entirely proper for the
district attorney to state that if the jury reached the conclusion
that the defendant had committed murder they should find him
guilty of manslaughter as charged.
Attempted Aggravated Rape
The Crimes Act of 1805, and the subsequent Louisiana statutes
which supplemented it, failed to include any general provision for
17. Art. 30, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
18. La. Crim. Code of 1942, p. 31.
19. Art. 31, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
20. Art. 32, La. Crtm. Code of 1942.
21. 204 La. 523, 538, 15 So. (2d) 874, 878 (1943).
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the punishment of attempts to commit the various crimes. This
important phase of the substantive criminal law was partially
covered by the enactment of a number of special statutes which
prescribed punishment for aggravated assaults with a specific
intent to commit certain serious crimes against the person. For
example, attempted murder, rape or robbery was punished as
"assault with intent to murder, rape or rob. '22 At the same
time, attempts to commit a number of serious crimes were en-
tirely omitted and an offender who fell short of the successful
completion of his purported offense went scot free. The Criminal
Code of 1942, rather than depend upon hit-or-miss legislative en-
actments, provided a complete coverage of attempts in Article 27,
which declares that "Any person who, having a specific intent to
commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tend-
ing directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an
attempt to commit the offense intended .. .," and sets the maxi-
mum punishment for an attempt at twenty years imprisonment in
the case of capital offenses and at one-half of the punishment for
the completed offense in other cases. In State v. BurriS2 8 the
defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced to six years im-
prisonment in the state penitentiary for the crime of attempted
aggravated rape. Defense counsel sought to confuse the issue by
reference to the now repealed statute punishing an assault with
intent to rape, and argued that after the repeal of this special
statute the conduct prescribed therein was no longer criminal.
The Louisiana Supreme Court summarily dismissed this conten-
tion and simply applied the pertinent articles of the Criminal
Code.2 4 Article 27 clearly defines criminal attempts so as to in-
clude an attempt to commit the crime of aggravated rape.
Confidence Game-Theft
In State ex tel. Kavanaugh v. Mitchiner4a the petitioner, who
had been convicted, sentenced and confined in the Louisiana State
Penitentiary for violation of the confidence game statute2 5 brought
a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the offense of "confidence
game" was not sufficiently defined and that his conviction and
imprisonment was therefore a denial of due process of law. If the
22. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 792, as amended by La. Act 59 of 1896, and
La. Act 9 of 1912, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 766].
2. 204 La. 608, 16 So. (2d) 124 (1943).
24. Art. 27, Attempts; Art. 41, Rape; and Art. 42, Aggravated Rape.
24a. 204 La. 415, 15 So. (2d) 809 (1943).
25. LaL. Act 43 of 1912 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 946].
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offense had been committed after the effective date of the 1942
Criminal Code, the defendant would have been guilty of theft as
defined in Article 67 of that Code. Theft includes any case where
a person secures another's property "by means of fraudulent con-
duct, practices or representations," and thus covers those offenses
which had formerly been separately designated as larceny, em-
bezzlement, obtaining by false pretenses and the confidence game.
The court's decision in the Mitchiner case is significant, however,
because it indicates a complete realization of the fact that the
definitions of crimes cannot be expected to specify each of the
various detailed ways that those crimes may be committed. The
confidence game had been defined by the Louisiana statute as ob-
taining money or property "by means or by use of any false or
bogus checks, or by any other means, instrument or device, com-
monly called the confidence game.... ." (Italics supplied.) It was
argued that this did not sufficiently inform the defendant of the
charge made against him. In upholding the constitutionality of
the confidence game statute the court pointed out that the crimes
of murder and burglary, for example, might also be committed
in any number of ways, and concluded that the confidence game
statute should not be held unconstitutional "simply because it
does not ad infinitum attempt to list every conceivable means
through which the offense might be perpetrated. 2
An analogous problem was similarly solved in State v. Pete-
wherein the appellant had contended that Article 67 of the Crim-
inal Code, which defines the crime of Theft., was unconstitutional
because it covered the criminal activity which had been previous-
ly separately designated as larceny, obtaining by false pretenses,
embezzlement and the confidence game. Mr. Justice Fournet's
handling of this point is significant. He states that in Article 67
"the Legislature sought to denounce under the single heading of
'theft' all of the crimes that it considered constituted the culpable
taking of anything of value belonging to another, whether such
taking was without the consent of the owner, commonly known
as larceny, or the taking with his consent as is the case in con-
fidence games, embezzlement, and false pretenses. This is in ac-
cordance with the modern trend, followed in numerous states, of
simplifying the law by discarding ancient and outmoded forms
and re-defining offenses to prevent confusion and injustices." Any
26. 204 La. 426, 15 So. (2d) 809, 812.
27. 206 La. 1078, 20 So. (2d) 368 (1944), discussed in Comment (1944) 6
LOUISIANA LAw RsviEw 72, 77.
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other approach to the problem would have virtually prevented
any major improvements in the criminal law.
Conspiracy to Break Prison
Section 867 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 covered two
crimes, i. e., breaking or conspiring to break prison and malicious
prosecution. The definitions of these crimes were separated by a
semi-colon, and the penalty was stated at the end of the section
and immediately after the definition of malicious prosecution. In
State v. Coverdale28 the petitioner had been convicted of a con-
spiracy to break prison and sentenced accordingly. He applied
for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the sentence had been
illegally imposed since Section 867 provided no penalty for the
crime of breaking prison.2 9 In denying the petitioner's application
the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed that the statute would have
been clearer if the conjunctive "or" had appeared in place of the
semi-colon in Section 867. The court, however, adopted the very
practical and generally accepted view that "'Punctuation... can-
not control its [a statute's] construction against the manifest in-
tent of the legislature, and the court will punctuate or dis-
regard punctuation . . . to ascertain and give effect to the real
intent. . .' ,;o and concluded that the legislative intent to levy
the same penalty against both crimes was clear. The fact that the
part of the statute denouncing malicious prosecution had been
superseded by a 1902 statute covering that offenses' was immate-
rial, since the subsequent statute had no relation to the crime of
conspiracy to break prison nor to the penalty clause in its appli-
cation to that offense.
Section 867 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 was expressly in-
cluded in the repealing clause of the Louisiana Criminal Code and
prison breaking is now covered by Articles 109 and 110 of that
Code. The distinction between Aggravated Escape (Article 109)
and Simple Escape (Article 110) is dependent upon whether or
not human life is endangered by the escape. A conspiracy to
commit Aggravated or Simple Escape would be punishable under
Article 26 which defines a Criminal Conspiracy so as to be appli-
28. 204 La. 448, 15 So. (2d) 849 (1943).
29. It is well settled that a criminal statute is ineffective unless it fixes
the penalty for the offense. State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 84 So. 41 (1920).
80. 204 La. 448, 450, 15 So. (2d) 849 (1948).
31. La. Act 107 of 1902, § 3 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1294].
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cable to all of the various crimes set out in the Criminal Code
and sets the penalty at one-half of that provided for commission
of the crime planned.
Gambling-Slot Machines
Article 90 of the Criminal Code defines gambling as "the in-
tentional conducting, or directly assisting in the conducting, as
a business, of any game, contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby
a person risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize a
profit." (Italics supplied.) This act superseded a number of Lou-
isiana statutes which had proscribed various specific forms of
gambling, and those statutes were accordingly repealed.82 The
important change effected by Article 90, in addition to the fact
that gambling is defined generally rather than by means of specific
detailed instances, was the limitation that only the person who
conducted or assisted in conducting the gambling "as a business"
was to be punished. No attempt was made to include the patrons
of gambling establishments nor the participants in a friendly
gambling game. Previous statutes had not been enforced against
that class of individuals and it was deemed appropriate that the
crime of gambling should only include those who maintain and
operate gambling devices or establishments "as a business."33
One of the specific gambling statutes repealed was Act 107 of
1908 which made it a misdemeanor to play or operate a slot ma-
chine or other mechanical gambling device or to permit such a
device to remain or to be operated on the premises.3 ' In State v.
Schimpf85 the defendant had been prosecuted under Article 90
for possession of one hundred and two mechanical gambling de-
vices consisting of slot machines and pin-ball machines. In re-
versing a conviction, the supreme court held that the business of
gambling as defined in Article 90 did not contemplate nor include
the mere possession of gambling paraphernalia.
At the time Schimpf was tried for the crime of ga'mbling, the
sheriff had seized the automatic pay-off machines which were
found in his warehouse and planned to confiscate the same under
authority of Act 231 of 1928.386 In the companion case of Schimpf
32. La. Act 43 of 1942, § 2.
33. "The phrase 'as a business' shall be construed to mean or include
cases where gambling may take place only from time to time and yet be
profitable to the operator although not his main line of business." Reporters'
comment, Louisiana Criminal Code (1942) 96.
34. Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § § 1007, 1008.
35. 203 La. 835, 14 So. (2d) 676 (1943).
36. Dart's Crim. Stats. (1943) § 1009.
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v. Thomas3 7 an action was brought to enjoin the sheriff from de-
stroying these machines. A number of interesting points were
decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in that case. First, it was
held that the 1928 statute providing for the confiscation and de-
struction of slot machines had not been repealed, either expressly
or impliedly, by the Criminal Code. It was, therefore, full author-
ity for the seizure and confiscation. Second, the court properly
construed the language of this statute as requiring the law en-
forcement officers to confiscate all slot machines coming to their
attention, whether the machines were being operated or not.8 8 A
third point dealt with the scope of the term "slot machine."
Schimpf had argued that pin-ball machines did not come within
the definition and that it should be limited to that type of gam-
bling devices which are commonly referred to as "one-armed ban-
dits." The majority of the supreme court, however, adopted a
broader definition. In considering this point on the rehearing, Mr.
Justice Hamiter relied upon the dictionary definition that "A slot
machine is a machine the operation of which is started by dropping
a coin into a slot." He then pointed out that all of the automatic
machines seized came within the statute since they automatically
paid off in money if the player was fortunate enough to hit or
make the right combination. 9
Prohibition-Scope of Local Option Ordinances
Local option ordinances have given rise to a number of nice
problems of interpretation. In State v. Bernard0 a defendant was
apprehended in dry territory with whiskey, which had been pur-
chased in another parish for friends, in his possession. The court
held that this did not constitute a violation of the prohibition or-
dinance of the latter parish which made it an offense to "engage
in the business of handling intoxicating liquor." Chief Justice
O'Niell, who wrote the opinion, stressed the normal meaning of
the language employed in the ordinance and concluded that the
offense was clearly limited to buying, selling, dealing or trading
in intoxicant liquors as a business. This view was further sub-
37. 204 La. 541, 15 So. (2d) 880 (1943).
38. Chief Justice O'Niell, dissenting, took the view that the statute should
be interpreted so as to limit the duty of confiscation to slot machines which
were found "in operation." 204 La. 541, 554, 15 So. (2d) 880, 884.
On rehearing Mr. Justice Hamiter pointed out that the majority opinion
was strengthened by the fact that the title of the statute spoke of machines
which might come to the officers' attention and made no reference whatsoever
to those found in operation. 204 La. 541, 558, 559, 15 So. (2d) 880, 886.
39. 204 La. 541, 559, 15 So. (2d) 880, 886.
40. 204 La. 844, 16 So. (2d) 454 (1943).
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stantiated by the local option' statute4' which repeatedly used
such phrases as "traffic in" and "business." Every pertinent pro-
vision of that act, concluded the court, indicated a legislative pur-
pose to authorize local governmental units to prohibit the sale of
or traffic in intoxicating liquors, but not to authorize a prohibition
against the possession of such commodities. The case of State v.
Bonner,42 where the supreme court had held that "selling" was
equivalent to "engaging in the business of selling," was distin-
guished from the instant case where the defendant merely pos-
sessed and transferred liquors not for sale. Had the defendant
been acting as agent for the seller in delivering liquor in dry ter-
ritory an entirely different situation would have been presented.
A similar result was reached in State v. Richards48 where an
indictment for violation of a local option ordinance was held to be
insufficient because of a failure to charge that the accused was
"engaged in the traffic or the business" of the manufacture, han-
dling or sale of intoxicating liquor. In that case the undisputed
facts recited in the judge's per curiam showed that the defendant,
an auto mechanic, had purchased wine in another parish and
.brought the same to his hQme in dry territory for private con-
sumption.
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Prescription
Time tends to gradually becloud the facts and circumstances
of a criminal case and to wear away the proofs of innocence. Thus,
Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that offenses,
except certain enumerated and very serious felonies, shall not be
tried unless a charge is brought "within one year after the offense
shall have been made known to the judge, district attorney or
grand jury having jurisdiction... ." In State v. Brocato' it was
held that information given to three assistant district attorneys
concerning the embezzlement of state funds was sufficient to put
the district attorney on notice and to commence the running of
the prescriptive period. In arriving at this decision, the Louisiana
41. La. Act 17 of 1935 (1 E.S.) [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1943) § 1362.41J.
42. 193 La. 387, 190 So. 621 (1939).
43. 205 La. 410, 17 So. (2d) 567 (1944). Mr. Justice Higgins cited and relied
upon the Bernard decision. Accord: State v. Nomey, 204 La. 667, 16 So. (2d)
226 (1943) holding that mere proof of possession of intoxicating liquors is
insufficient to sustain a conviction under either a local prohibition ordinance
or the state statute regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages. La. Act 15 of
1934, as last amended by La. Act 202 of 1940 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1943) §
1362.13].
44. 205 La. 1019, 18 So. (2d) 602 (1944).
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Supreme Court relied upon the leading case of State v. Oliver
4
"
which held that notice of facts concerning the commission of an
offense was sufficient to put the district attorney on inquiry and
was the equivalent of actual knowledge of the information which
such inquiry would have revealed.
It is well settled by Louisiana jurisprudence that an indict-
ment charging a crime committed more than a year before the
date of the indictment is an absolute nullity if it does not contain
an allegation negativing prescription. 46 In State v. Gehlbach 7 the
bill of information charged acts of embezzlement committed sev-
eral years before and'stated that "'more than one year hbas not
elapsed since the commission of the aforesaid offenses was made
known to the Judge, District Attorney, or Grand Jury having
jurisdiction thereof.' "4 Defense counsel relied upon the language
of Section 986 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 and argued that the
information was insufficient in that it had failed to negative knowl-
edge on the part of the attorney general, who is "a public officer
having power to direct a public prosecution." In a previous case,
State v. Bussa,4 9 the Louisiana Supreme Court had held that Sec-
tion 986 of the Revised Statutes is superseded by Article 8 of the
1928 Code of Criminal Procedure which does not include the at-
torney general in its enumeration of those public officials whose
knowledge of the crime will commence the running of the pre-
scriptive period. Also, Articles 17 and 156 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure place the charge and control of criminal prosecutions
solely in the hands of the district attorney. A 1934 statute,""
which had amended Articles 17 and 156 so as to give an attorney
general full power to institute and prosecute criminal proceed-
ings, was declared unconstitutional in Kemp v. Stanley.1' Thus,
the supreme court was not required to pass upon defendant's
contention that that statute had effected an implied amendment
to Article 8 so as to add the attorney general to the list of those
public officials whose knowledge of the crime will commence the
running of the prescriptive period.
The court, in the Gehlbach case, also overruled a very tech-
nical objection to the language used by the state in negativing
the running of prescription. The best form in such cases is to
45. 196 La. 659, 664, 665, 199 So. 793, 795 (1941).
46. Ibid.
47. 205 La. 340, 17 So. (2d) 349 (1943).
48. 205 La. 340, 342, 17 So. (2d) 349, 350.
49. 176 La. 87, 104, 145 So. 276, 281 (1932).
50. La. Act 24 of 1934 (1 E.S.) [Dart's Stats, (1943) Arts. 17, 156].
51. 204 La, 110, 15 So. (2d) 1 (1943).
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follow the exact language of Article 8 and state that the offense
had not been made known to the judge, district attorney or grand
jury having jurisdiction "within one year" from the filing of the
information. Defense counsel, and also Mr. Justice Higgins who
filed a very carefully written dissenting opinion, took the view
that the precise words "within the year" were sacramental and
that it was not sufficient to allege that "more than one year has
not elapsed since the commission of the aforesaid offenses was
made known to the judge, district attorney or.... ." The majority
of the supreme court justices adopted what appears to the writer
as a more practical, and also a correct approach to the problem.
They held that the phrases "within one year" and "no longer than
one year has elapsed" were synonymous and equivalent in import.
In each instance, it is alleged that the information is filed within
the first year, and that the second year has not yet begun.5
2
In addition to the one year prescriptive period which limits
the time within which the charge may be brought, Article 8 also
provides a limitation as to the time during which the indictment
or information may be permitted to lie dormant. This article, as
originally drafted, provided that the district attorney must either
prosecute the case or enter a nolle prosequi within six years after
an indictment for a felony is returned. A 1942 amendment"3 re-
duced this period to three years. This achieves a sound result. The
filing of dilatory pleas or continuances obtained by the accused
do not count in the three years' period, and there is no good reason
why the district attorney should keep an indictment or informa-
tion suspended over the head of the accused for a longer period
than three years. In State ex rel. Kavanaugh v. Mitchiner 4 the
court held that the shortened prescriptive period was inapplicable
to trials held before the effective date of that amendment. In that
case the accused had been tried, found guilty and sentenced
twenty-nine days before the effective date of the amendment to
Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction-Offenses Against Juveniles
The juvenile courts have jurisdiction over juveniles who are
charged as "Neglected or Delinquent Children." They also have
limited jurisdiction over adults who are prosecuted for contribu-
52. This ruling was followed with approval in State v. Doucet, 205 La. 648,
17 So. (2d) 907 (1944), but with Justices Higgins, Fournet and Ponder again
dissenting.
53. La. Act 323 of 1942 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1943) Art, 8, n.]
54. 204 La. 415, 15 So. (2d) 809 (1943).
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ting to juvenile neglect or delinquency, or for any misdemeanor
affecting the.physical or mental well-being of children.5 In State
V., Alord 6 a prosecution for indecent behavior with juveniles was
..ld to come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court on the
ground that. "the offense constituted contributing to the delin-
qviency of the ,juvenile." The juvenile court's jurisdiction might
also have been sustained on the ground that the article of the
Criminal Code 7 which had been violated was a law enacted for
the protection of the moral well-being of children.
Jurors-Improper Names on the General Venire List
Jurors who served on the petit jury at an original trial are,
on a retrial of the case, subject to challenge for cause.5 8 However,
the supreme court held in State v. Gros59 that the mere appear-
ance of the name of one such juror on the general venire list was
not sufficient ground for setting aside the entire venire. The court
relied on Article 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which
expressly provides that the venire cannot, in the absence of fraud
or irreparable injury, be set aside because some of the jurors
listed are disqualified or because of an irregularity in the manner
of selection.
In State v. Iseringhausen,60 Article 203 was again applied
when the court overruled defendant's motion to quash and set
aside the general venire and the petit jury list on the ground
that nine of the three hundred names listed on the general venire
were not names of registered voters of the parish. In this case
there was serious doubt as to whether any substantial error had
been committed in the selection of the general venire. Mr. Justice
Ponder, speaking for the supreme court, stated that the venire-
men might be. residents of the parish, and thus qualified for jury
service,6 1 even though they were not registered voters. He also
pointed out that the registrar of voters had merely reported that
his list did not include any names with the exact spelling of those
in question, and concluded that if the names on the venire list
were misspelled, that defect was not of great consequence. Ab-
solute. accuracy of spelling is not required so long as the identity
of the individual venireman is sufficiently revealed.
55. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 52.
56. 206 La. 100, 18 So. (2d) 666 (1944).
57. Art. 81, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
58. Art. 351(3), La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
59. 204 La. 705, 16 So. (2d) 238 (1943).
60. 204 La. 593, 16 So. (2d) 65 (1943).
61. Art. 172, La. Code of Crim, Proc, of 1928.
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Jury-Exclusion of Negroes as Denial of "Equal Protection"
Prior to the famous case of Pierre v. State of Louisiana,6 2 the
Louisiana Supreme Court had taken the view that the exclusion
of negroes from the general jury venire list did not constitute an
unconstitutional discrimination against defendants of the colored
race. Louisiana courts had reasoned that the exclusion of negroes
was a logical result of the fact that the jury commissioners were
white men. Thus it was natural that they would select veniremen
from members of the white race who they would be acquainted
with and would feel were best qualified for service.6 3
In the Pierre case, a negro had been indicted, tried and found
guilty of murdering a white man. Despite the fact that over one-
third of the parish population consisted of negroes, the general
venire list from which the jury had been selected contained no
negro names. Evidence submitted by the defense counsel, who had
filed a motion to quash the venire, showed that no negroes had
served on any local jury during the period from 1896 to 1936. In
1936 the jury venire list of 300 had contained three negroes' names
-one was dead, one was misspelled, and one served. Based upon
this showing, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court's decision and held that the jury commis-
sioners had systematically and deliberately excluded negroes
from the juries, thus denying Pierre, a negro defendant, equal
protection of the law.
Later, Pierre was re-tried and convicted of murder., Again
the defense counsel moved to quash the indictment on the ground
that the jury commissioners had discriminated in excluding ne-
groes from the general venire list. It was urged that while more
than forty-nine per cent of the parish population was colored, the
venire list of three hundred names only included fifty-two ne-
groes. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the United States
Supreme Court had not laid down a requirement that the jury
list must contain a proportionate percentage of negroes; but had
only established the rule that a systematic exclusion of negroes
from the jury list consisted of denial of equal protection where
the accused was colored. Roughly speaking, the percentage of
negroes should be in proportion to the "qualified" negroes, and
many negroes do not meet the literacy and character qualifica-
62. 306 U.S. 354, 50 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed. 757 (1939). See Note (1939) 1
LOUISIANA LAW REvEw 841 re subsequent hearing of the case.
63. State v. Turner, 133 La. 555, 63 So. 169 (1913).
64. State v. Pierre, 198 La. 619, 8 $O. (2d) 895 (1941).
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tions for jury service. The United States Supreme Court was ap-
parently satisfied with this interpretation of its decision, for a
writ of certiorari was denied.6
While a systematic exclusion of negroes from the jury lists
because of color will be a proper basis for a motion before the
trial to quash the jury venire, the grand jury panel or the indict-
ment, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that such matters
cannot be raised for the first time on a motion for a new trial.66
Objections to the mode of selection or to the composition of the
grand or petit jury are waived unless raised before trial.
In the recent case of State v. Anderson, 7 a negro had been
indicted for the murder of a white man. Motions were properly
filed to quash the indictment and to set aside the petit jury panel
on the ground that negroes had been systematically excluded in
selecting the general venire list of three hundred names with
which the grand jury was selected and from which the petit jury
was drawn to serve on the cAse. Evidence established the fact that
while between ten and twenty per cent of the population of the
parish consisted of negroes, never in the thirty-one years of the
parish's history had a negro served on a grand or petit jury, and
in the instant case only one negro name had been originally placed
on the general venire list of three hundred names. Relying upon
these facts, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a prima facie
case of racial discrimination and denial of equal protection had
been made out, and that the motions to quash the indictment and
set aside the petit jury panel should have been sustained. Al-
though acknowledging the fact that a considerable proportion of
the negro population were unqualified for jury service, the court
stressed the fact that the parish provided eight negro schools
which were attended by 876 colored pupils and concluded that
some of the colored populace should be sufficiently educated and
otherwise qualified for jury service.
It may be safely predicted that after the Pierre case and its
application in State v. Anderson Louisiana trial judges will be
careful to see that a reasonable proportion of negro names are
included in the general venire list. This does not mean that the
names must be in proportion to negro population, but merely
means that they must be in proportion to the qualified negro
population. Actually a considerable number of the negroes in
65. 314 U.S. 676, 62 S.Ct. 186, 86 L.Ed. 541 (1941).
66. State v. White, 193 La. 775, 192 So. 345 (1939).
67. 205 La. 710, 18 So. (2d) 33 (1944),
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every parish will be disqualified along lines of literacy or moral
character, and due process will not be interpreted to require in-
clusion according to strict mathematical percentages.
Separation of Jury
It is important to the administration of criminal justice that
the jurors who are to try a case shall be kept entirely free from
any outside influence. To that end Article 394 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure stipulates that "From the moment of the accept-
ance of any juror ... the jurors shall be kept together under the
charge of an officer...." In the case of State v. Towns,68 a murder
trial, four jurors had been accepted by both the state and the
defense. Four prospective jurors, who had not yet been examined,
were sitting in the jury box with the accepted jurors. Over the
objection of defense counsel, the four accepted jurors were per-
mitted to leave the jury room for a few minutes in a body and in
the custody of the sheriff. During their absence the court re-
mained at ease. After coiviction the defendant appealed, urging
that~there had been a separation of jurors in violation of Article
394. The supreme court, in affirming the verdict and sentence,
pointed out that this provision applied only to the accepted jurors
who will actually try the case, and not to prospective jurors who
may or may not serve at the trial. Mr. Justice Ponder emphasized
the difference between accepted and prospective jurors by re-
ferring to the case of State v. Craighead9 where it was held re-
versible error for accepted jurors to be placed in custody of the
sheriff over night with a number of prospective jurors who had
not yet been accepted and sworn. Article 394, by the very nature
of things, applies only to accepted jurors. It is the purpose of the
law to keep those jurors who are actually to try the case together
and away from any possible outside influence.
Jury-Number of Jurors
In State v. Stanford"0 the court applied a well-settled rule
that the number of jurors to try a case is determined by the
gravity of the crime charged and not by the verdict rendered. In
that case, the defendant had been indicted for manslaughter, and
it was held appropriate for the twelve man jury which heard the
68. 205 La. 530, 17 So. (2d) 814 (1944).
69. 114 La. 84, 38 So. 28 (1905).
70. 204 La. 439, 15 So. (2d) 817 (1943), followed without discussion in State
v. Iseringhausen, 204 La. 593, 608, 16 So. (2d) 65, 69 (1943).
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case to return a verdict.of negligent homicide, despite the fact that
an original trial for this lesser offense which is only a quasi-felony.
would have been held before a bob-tail jury of five.
Indictments-Essential Allegations and Short Forms
Much of the difficulty inherent in the prolix and cumbersome
common law indictment forms has been eliminated by the short
forms of indictment which are authorized by Article 235 of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.71 The crime of manslaugh-
ter is sufficiently charged by alleging that "A.B. unlawfully killed
C.D." In State v. Iseringhausen72 the information charged that the
defendant "'did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously kill and slay
one Theresa Iseringhausen.'" In upholding the sufficiency of this
information, the supreme court pointed out that it met all re-
quirements of the short form as well as the form recognized prior
to the Code of Criminal Procedure.3 The added words "wilfully
and feloniously" were treated as surplusage and did not vitiate
the bill of information.74
Article 103 of the Criminal Code enumerates a number of
different ways in which a person may be guilty of the offense of
disturbing the peace, and replaces several former statutes which
were expressly repealed by the Code. In State v. Morgan7 5 a bill
of information charging that the defendant "did unlawfully dis-
turb the peace" at a particular place, without stating the specific
manner in which the offense was committed, was held insufficient
and subject to a motion to quash. The supreme court pointed out
that a defendant in such a situation is not required to validate the
defective information by requesting that the omitted allegations
be furnished in a bill of particulars. The Morgan case follows the
previous holding in State v. Verdin7 where, under a similar dis-
turbance of the peace statute, it was held that an indictment was
insufficient when it failed to specifically charge the commission
of one or more of the separate and distinct acts enumerated in the
statute.
71. See Comment (1944) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 78.
72. 204 La. 593, 605, 16 So. (2d) 65, 68 (1943).
73. "Prior to the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the
crime of manslaughter, it was sufficient to allege in the indictment or bill of
information 'that the accused did feloniously kill and slay the deceased.'"
204 La. 593, 605, 16 So. (2d) 65, 69.
74. Art. 240, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
75. 204 La. 499, 15 So. (2d) 866 (1943).
76. 192 La. 275, 187 So. 66 (1939).
77. La. Act 31 of 1886, as amended by La. Act. 227 of 1934 [Dart's Crim.
Stats. (1932) § 848].
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A similar difficulty was encountered in State v. Hebert"
.where six bills of information had been filed against the defend-
ant charging that he "'did unlawfully and feloniously commit
indecent behavior, as defined by Article 81 of the Louisiana Crim-
inal Code.'" The supreme court, which expressly applied the
same ruling as in the Morgan case, held that the bills of informa-
tion were fatally -defective and should have been quashed because
they failed to disclose the particular manner in which the offense
had been committed. The court pointed out that under Article 81
indecent behavior may be committed in more than one way, i. e.,
by the commission of lewd or lascivious acts either on the person
or in the presence of a child under the age of seventeen; and,
further declared that "in either case, he [the defendant] is en-
titled to specific information as to the kind and character of the
acts he is alleged to have committed."
A 1944 amendment"" to Article 235 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is significant in regard to the problem raised by these
decisions. It enlarges the scope of the short form indictment by
providing that, in addition to the short forms already specifically
set out, any crime included in the Criminal Code may be charged
"using the name and article number of the offense committed." If
the informations in the Morgan and Hebert cases had been filed
after the effective date of this 1944 amendment, it would have
been fully sufficient to charge that the defendant committed the
offense of disturbing the peace, or of indecent behavior with
juveniles, as proscribed by Article 103 or Article 81 of the Crim-
inal Code, as the case might be. Then if the defense counsel re-
quired further information concerning the specific manner and
details of the offense charged, he could secure the same through
a bill of particulars. It is well settled by jurisprudence, in Lou-
isiana and elsewhere, that the short form of indictment which
states the crime charged, leaving the details to be secured
through a bill of particulars, is in compliance with the accused's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge
made against him.80
Article 93 of the Criminal Code, which defines the offense of
cruelty to juveniles, specifically includes the requirement, taken
from the previous statute punishing those who contributed to the
78. 205 La. 110, 111, 17 So. (2d) 3, 4 (1944), noted in (1944) 19 Tulane
L. Rev. 144.
79. La. Act 223 of 1944, discussed in Daggett and Bennett, Louisiana
Legislation of 1944 (1944) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1, 17.
80. For a discussion of the short form indictment-its history, develop-
ment and constitutionality, see Comment (1944) 6 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 78.
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delinquency of children,' that the offender must be "over the age
of 17." This proviso is really in the nature of surplusage"2 since no
person under the age of 17 is subject to criminal prosecution, ex-
cept for capital crimes.8 It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that
the supreme court should have held in State v. Toney " that a
failure to charge that the accused is "over 17" was fatal to an
accusation for cruelty to juveniles. Such a requirement is, by the
very nature of things, impliedly included in every charge of a
non-capital crime. The problem arising in the Toney case " will be
avoided in the future by use of the short form authorized by the
1944 amendment to Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Where a bill of information is quashed because of a failure to
charge the offense with a sufficient degree of certainty, the proper
procedure for the State is to apply for the court's permission to
amend the information so as to fully meet the requirements of
the law.8
Bill of Particulars-Limitations on Use
In State v. Iseringhausen," the defendant was charged with
manslaughter, having killed his daughter with a shotgun. The
facts of the case were such that the jury might find that the kill-
ing was unintentional and the result of criminal negligence only,
in which case the defendant would be guilty of the lesser crime
of negligent homicide.8 8 Defense counsel's motion for a bill of par-
ticulars, wherein the state would be required to specify whether
the killing was intentional or was a result of gross (criminal)
negligence, was properly overruled. The supreme court stressed
the fact that the granting or refusing of a bill of particulars is
within the sound discretion of the trial judge; and astutely pointed
out that the defense counsel, by its requested bill of particulars,
"was endeavoring to place the State in the position of abandon-
either one or the other of the responsive verdicts [manslaug-
ter or negligent homicide] that might be rendered under the
charge." 8
81. La. Act 169 of 1918 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 930].
82. The clause was retained in Article 93 out of abundant caution in
order to be sure that the new provision would not be construed as attempt-
ing to depart from the previous statute in that regard.
88. La. Const. of 1921, Art VII, § 52.
84. 205 La. 451, 17 So. (2d) 624 (1944).
85. Ibid.
86. State v. Morgan, 204 La. 499, 15 So. (2d) 866 (1943), applying Art. 253,
La. Code' of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
87. 204 La. 593, 16 So. (2d) 65 (1943).
88. Art. 32, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
89. 204 La. 593, 606, 16 So. (2d) 65, 69 (1943).
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In State v. Alford,90 the affidavit, which charged a defendant
with the offense of indecent behavior with juveniles, alleged
that the crime was committed "on or about the 23rd day of Sep-
tember 1943." In a motion for a bill of particulars, defensecounsel
asked that the prosecuting attorney be required to state the exact
date and time when the alleged misconduct occurred. In uphold:-
ing the trial court's refusal to order the prosecution to set out the
hour at which the crime was committed, Chief Justice O'Niell,
speaking for a unanimous court, declared that the indictment, in-
formation or affidavit, on which the prosecution is founded, need
not state the time of day or night when the alleged offense was
committed "unless the tiime, or the question of day or night, is es-
sential, as in the case of burglary in the nighttime." The allegation
that the crime was committed "on or about the 23rd day of Sep-
tember, 1943" was deemed sufficiently definite, the court taking
the view that the words "or about" were surplusage and that the
date specified should be treated as the real or exact date.
Motion to Elect-Thefts Cumulated in One Indictment
In State v. Savoy9 ' a tax assessor had been indicted for the
embezzlement of public funds, and the various embezzlements
cumulated in one count as authorized by Article 225 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure 2 At a previous hearing of the case the:su-
preme court held that the several misappropriations constituted a
single offense and were properly charged in a single count." Sub-
sequently, a bill of particulars was filed and in answer thereto the
various items or amounts misappropriated were separately listed.
Defense counsel then filed a motion to compel the state to try
the defendant separately for the embezzlement of each of the
items-one at a time-as listed in the bill of particulars. In hold-
ing that the prosecution could not be compelled to try the de-
fendant separately for each of the items making up the aggre-
gate amount embezzled during his tenure of office, Chief Justice
O'Niell pointed out that such a procedure would virtually emas-
culate the provision in Article 225 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
90. 206 La. 100, 18 So. (2d) 666 (1944).
91. 205 La. 650, 17 So. (2d) 908 (1944).
92.. This article was re-enacted by La. Act 57 of 1940 as substantive: law
in order to remedy a holding of unconstitutionality in State v. Rodosta, 173
14a. 623, 138 So. .124 (1931). See Note (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 159.
93. 204 La. 99, 14 So. (2d) 924 (1943). The principles of law involved Are.
set out in State v. Doucet, 202 La. 1071, 13 So. (2d) 353 (1943), discussed in
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1942-1943 Term (1944)
5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 512, 566 .1.. . I . . I ..,
[Vol... .
1945] WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT 193
dure which authorizes the lumping of several misappropriations
in one count, with the total amount misappropriated determining
the grade of the offense. Chief Justice O'Niell further pointed out
that the several misappropriations of all went to make up "one
offense," and that the correctness of this interpretation was veri-
fied by the last paragraph of the Theft article of the 1942 Louisi-
ana Criminal Code which provides that "When there has been
misappropriation or taking by a number of distinct acts of the
offender, the aggregate of the amount of the misappropriations or
takings shall determine the grade of the offense. '
94
Former Jeopardy
Article I, Section 9 of the Louisiana Constitution, and also Ar-
ticle 274 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, declare the
obviously just principle that no person shall be twice put in jeop-
ardy for the same offense. This rule is, however, subject to certain
limitations. It is expressly inapplicable where the second trial
comes as a result of the defendant's application for a new trial or
motion in arrest of judgment. In this situation the second trial is
an advantage, rather than a detriment to the defendant and he is
in no position to complain. In State v. Gros,95 defendant, tried
and convicted of shooting with intent to murder, had been granted
a new trial upon the ground that the twelve man jury rendering
the verdict was improperly constituted. 6 At the second trial, de-
fense counsel filed a plea of former jeopardy. In sustaining the
trial court's overruling of this plea, the supreme court stressed
the fact that the new trial had been granted by the defendant's
own motion and was, therefore, within the exact meaning and in-
tendment of the exception to the double jeopardy provision. Mr.
Justice Fournet, speaking for the court, also stressed the fact that
the jury of twelve which sat at the first trial "was not legally con-
stituted." Article 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
94. A companion procedural statute, La. Act 147 of 1942, which was
enacted to synchronize the Code of Criminal Procedure with the new sub-
stantive criminal law, amended Article 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
so as to provide in part "that whenever anyone, by virtue of his office,
employment or of any fiduciary relationship which he may occupy towards
another, shall be entrusted with any money or other thing of value, and
shall misappropriate the same, he may be charged in one count with the
theft of::the aggregate amount misappropriated by him during the entire
time of his holding such office, employment or relationship."
915. 204 La. 705, 16 So. (2d) 238 (1943).
96. The crime charged with not "necessarily punishable. at hard labor"
and was therefore triable by a bob-tail jury of five. La. Const. of i921, Art.
VII, § 41. 1 . .... ;
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codifies the law as to what shall amount to former jeopardy, states
an express requirement "that the court in which the former trial
took place had jurisdiction, and was legally constituted ..
Viewing Scene of the Crime
In State v. Westn the defendant was on trial for the theft of
three hogs. Evidence introduced indicated that at about the time
prosecuting witness' hogs were lost the defendant and his assist-
ants had killed and dressed three hogs in a certain wooded sec-
tion. The hair removed from the hogs was buried at the scene of
the butchering. There was a conflict in the testimony on the ma-
terial issue as to whether the color of the prosecuting witness'
hogs and that of the hogs killed by defendant was the same. The
trial court refused defense counsel's request that the jurors visit
the place where the hogs had been butchered to examine and de-
termine the color of the buried hair. Upon appeal from a convic-
tion the supreme court held that the question of whether the
jurors should be taken to view the scene of the crime is one
"which addresses itself largely to the discretion of the court," and
that no abuse of that discretion was shown. The color of the hair
of the hogs killed could have been adequately established by the
testimony of witnesses or by identifying the hair and bringing it
into court for inspection. Thus the trial judge might very wisely
have refused to order the requested visitation.
District Attorney's Argument to Jury-Permissible Scope
In State v. Tucker,98 where a defendant was on trial for the
possession of marijuana cigarettes, the district attorney stated
during the course of his argument to the jury that" 'The evidence
shows that this man is not an ordinary salesman. I say that this
man is a big operator....'" These remarks did not constitute re-
versible error since abundant and convincing evidence had been
submitted in support of the statement. In affirming the convic-
tion, Mr. Justice Fournet briefly, but clearly, summarized prior
Louisiana jurisprudence as to the permissible scope of the dis-
trict attorney's argument to the jury. The prosecuting officer
must base his conclusions and deductions upon evidence ad-
duced.99 He is, however, permitted to argue the case with a rea-
97. 204 La. 475, 15 So. (2d) 858 (1943).
98. 204 La. 463, 15 So. (2d). 854 (1943).
99. Citing State v. Conners, 142 La. 206, 76 So. 611 (1917).
[Vol. VI
1945] WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT 195
sonable degree of freedom, 00 and a jury verdict will not be set
aside on the ground of intemperate and improper remarks by the
district attorney unless there is a clear showing that such remarks
influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict found.' 0'
Judge's Charge to the Jury
Article 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
the trial judge shall instruct the jury on the law, but not on the
facts of the case. The jurors, in criminal cases, are the sole judges
of the weight and credibility of the evidence presented. While the
trial judge is prohibited from summarizing the evidence so as to
indicate what facts have been proved or disproved, our Louisiana
courts have recognized that a complete statement of the law fre-
quently involves some reference to the evidence presented.10 2 In
State v. Burris,0 8 a prosecution for attempted rape, the trial judge
charged the jury that they might take into consideration all facts
and circumstances surrounding the case "including any testimony
which may have been offered tending to show the extent and pur-
pose of assaulting the party, and any attempt to remove her gar-
ments and the nature of the garments removed. 0 4 Counsel for
the defense argued that the judge's charge constituted prejudicial
comment on the evidence, in that it directed their attention to the
torn underwear that was introduced in evidence by the state. In
overruling this contention, the supreme court pointed out that
the judge's charge had not assumed or indicated that any fact was
proved or disproved, nor had the judge intimated any opinion
thereon. The trial judge had called the jurors' particular attention
to the fact that they were sole judges of the weight and credibility
of the evidence presented.
Motion for a New Trial
The defendant's motion for a new trial must be founded upon
objections raised, with exceptions properly taken, at the time the
prejudicial conduct occurred. In State v. Gros' 5 the indictment
which the jury took with them for use during their deliberations,
contained an endorsement showing that a verdict of guilty had
100. Citing State v. Johnson, 119 La. 130, 43 So. 981, 982 (1907).
101. Citing State v. Johnson and Butler, 48 La. Ann. 87, 19 So. 213, 214
(1896), and a number of other Louisiana decisions.
102. State v. Richey, 198 La. 88, 3 So. (2d) 285 (1941).
103. 204 La. 608, 16 So. (2d) 124 (1943).
104. 204 La. 608, 615, 16 So. (2d) 124, 126.
105. 204 La. 705, 16 So. (2d) 238 (1943).
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been rendered upon the first trial of the case. This was improper
and might have been reversible error if defense counsel had
promptly objected when the indictment was first placed in the
hands of the jury.""6 The objection came too late, however, when
it was raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial. Mr.
Justice Fournet reiterated a former supreme court holding that
"'The guarantee under our constitution, Article 1, § 9, of a fair
and impartial trial does not contemplate that an accused can take
advantage of technical errors committed during the course of his
trial while he sat idly by without some showing that the errors
were prejudicial to his cause.' -1o7 A continued and consistent em-
phasis upon this very sound principle will do much to prevent the
use of our sometimes overly technical rules of criminal procedure
as a means of thwarting justice.
The right of the accused to a new trial for newly discovered
evidence is governed by Article 511 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, which requires that the proposed evidence must be newly
discovered and that it must also affirmatively appear that it could
not have been discovered before or during trial by the exercise of
reasonable diligence.108 In State v. Sterling'" the defendants,
who had been convicted of armed robbery, filed a motion for a
new trial based upon the claim that a statement by one of the
two victims, which contradicted the testimony given by the other
victim as prosecuting witness, had not come to the attention of
the defense until after verdict. The trial judge took the view,
which was supported by the facts of the case, that the appellants
were incorrect in their claim of lack of knowledge of the state-
ment relied upon as newly discovered evidence and that it would
have been possible for them to have procured and used the state-
ment prior to the completion of the trial. Since the motion for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was not
supported by the facts, the trial judge's refusal to grant that mo-
tion was upheld by the supreme court.
State v. West"' applied the well settled rule that it is not
error to deny a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, where such evidence would tend to merely
contradict or impeach the testimony of the state's witnesses. This
106. State v. Schaff, 154 La. 802, 98 So. 251 (1923).
107. 204 La. 705, 712, 16 So. (2d) 238, 241 (1943), quoting from State v.
Hoover, 203 La. 181, 191-192, 13 So. (2d) 784, 787 (1943).
108. State v. Saba, 203 La. 881, 14 So. (2d) 751 (1943), noted in (1943) 5
LOUISIANA LAW REvmw 474.
109. 205 La. 879, 18 So. (2d) 827 (1944).
110. 204 La. 475, 15 So. (2d) 858 (1943).
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rule is based upon the express stipulation in Article 511 that the
newly discovered evidence must do more than merely to impeach
the credibility of witnesses examined at the trial.
In a number of recent cases the supreme court applied the
well established rule that a conviction may not be set aside for in-
sufficiency of evidence.111 The jury's finding on all questions of
fact relating to the guilt or innocence of a defendant is final. It
is only where there is no evidence tending to prove a necessary
element of the crime that the verdict will be set aside. 1 2
Determinate Sentences
The 1926 indeterminate sentence law"3s which became Article
529 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided that, except as
to certain enumerated offenses, the sentence imposed should in-
clude both a minimum and a maximum term. After serving the
minimum term of his sentence a prisoner was eligible for parole.
Much confusion resulted from the complicated nature of the in-
determinate sentence provision and from the fact that the ex-
cepted offenses were not completely and precisely stated. As a
result many persons were committed to the penitentiary under
flat sentences for crimes which required indeterminate sentences.
In order to eliminate these problems, and to provide a more con-
sistent sentencing procedure, Article 529 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was amended in 1942 so as to require that all sentences
be determinate and for a fixed period. 1 4 At the same session of
the legislature a new parole statute was enacted which makes it
possible for any prisoner to apply for parole after he has served
one-third of the sentence imposed.113
The applicability of the new sentencing provision which calls
for a determinate sentence in all cases is dependent upon the time
when the offense was committed for "the law in effect at the time
of the commission of the offense is determinative of the penalty
111. State v. Tucker, 204 La. 463, 15 So. (2d) 854 (1943). See The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1942-1943 Term (1944) 5 LOUiSIANA
LAW REVXE W 512, 573.
. 112. State v. Nomey, 204 La. 667, 16 So. (2d) 226 (1943), holding that In
order to sustain a conviction for a prohibition law violation there must be
some evidence tending to show that the defendant was keeping the intoxi-
cants for sale. Mere proof of possession is insufficient.
113. La. Act 222 of 1926. See Wilson, Making the Punishment Fit the
Criminal (1942) 5 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 53, 63.
114. La. Act 46 of 1942 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1943) § 529].
115. La. Act 44 of 1942 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1943) § 725.1], discussed by
Wilson, Making the Punishment Fit the Criminal (1942) 5 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEw 66-73.
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which the convicted accused must suffer. '"""' Thus, where an
offense was committed before the effective date of the amendment
to Article 529, even though the trial was held and sentence was
imposed at a later time, the old indeterminate sentence provision
controls, and a flat or determinate sentence for a fixed term will
be set aside and vacated.117
Habitual Offenders
The Habitual Criminal Act was amended in 1942118 so as to
make the statute more usable and to ameliorate the somewhat
Draconic sentences which were mandatory under the 1928 law.
The principal issue presented in State v. Dreaux"9 was the appli-
cability of the reduced penalties to a second offense committed
five days before the effective date of the new statute and tried
subsequent thereto. Defense counsel argued that the status of the
offender, who was tried and arraigned as a second offender after
the effective date of the new statute, was established at some un-
certain later date. It was not at all clear whether this later date
was to be the date when the defendant was found guilty of the
second offense, the date when he pleaded guilty as a second of-
fender, or the date when he was sentenced as such. The pivotal
question was-when does the defendant become a second offend-
er? The supreme court held that the date of commission of the
new felony which carried a heavier penalty because of past
transgressions, fixed the accused's status as a second offender.
Thus the more severe provisions of the 1928 law were applicable.
Amendment of Sentence-Effect of "Plea Bargaining"
Article 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers a
sentencing judge to amend the sentence imposed "up to the be-
ginning of the execution of the sentence." In State v. Mocko-
sher120 a negligent homicide case, the defendant originally
pleaded not guilty. After a conference with the district attorney
116. State v. Gros, 205 La. 935, 18 So. (2d) 507 (1944).
117. Ibid. Cf. State v. Dreaux, 205 La. 387, 17 So. (2d) 559 (1944) where
an indeterminate sentence of from fourteen to twenty-eight years at hard
labor for a robbery committed before the effective date of the amendment
to Article 529 was annulled and set aside. The court pointed out that the
robbery was one of those crimes which was specifically excepted in Article
529 from the indeterminate sentence.
118. La. Act 45 of 1942 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1943) § 709.1], discussed by
Wilson, Making the Punishment Fit the Criminal (1942) 5 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEW 53, 60.
119. 205 La. 387, 17 So. (2d) 559 (1944).
120. 205 La. 434, 17 So. (2d) 575 (1944).
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and trial judge he withdrew a plea of not guilty and entered a
plea of guilty. Pursuant to an understanding arrived at between
defense counsel, the prosecution and the trial judge, the defendant
was sentenced to the state penitentiary for a period of ten
months. Subsequently, additional facts were brought to the dis-
trict attorney's attention by the widow of the deceased, where-
upon he filed a motion that the sentence be increased. In con-
formity with this motion the sentence was increased to three
years. In setting aside the new sentence the supreme court held
that Article 526 was inapplicable to a case like the one at bar
where a plea of guilty had been accepted with the understanding
that a limited sentence was to be imposed. In such a case, reasoned
the court, the defendant had surrendered "substantial rights" in
order to achieve a position of security insofar as the term of the
sentence was concerned. The court cited and relied upon its
analogous decision in State v. Boutte,121 where it had held that a
defendant, whose plea of guilty of a lesser charge had been ac-
cepted by the district attorney and the trial judge, could not
reinstate his original plea of not guilty. In that case the supreme
court had pointed out that the accused, by pleading guilty of the
lesser and included offense, had been thereby placed in a position
of security as to the more grievous charge; and declared that a
withdrawal of said plea would not be sustained in the absence of
a clear showing that the defendant stood willing to take chances
of a trial on the higher charge. The Louisiana Supreme Court thus
imposes a judicial limitation upon the otherwise sweeping lan-
guage of Article 526, and refuses to recognize the right of a trial
judge to increase a sentence in cases where the accused has en-
tered a plea of guilty in reliance upon an understanding as to the
sentence to be imposed. Apparently, although this point has not
been directly decided, this lack of power to change the sentence
is applicable even though the court were to permit the defendant
to withdraw his plea of guilty and stand trial. The benefits se-
cured by reasonable "plea bargaining" are thus given complete
judicial protection.
Appellate Jurisdiction of Supreme Court in Criminal Cases
Article VII, Section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution limits the
appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court in criminal cases to
"questions of law alone." Thus in State v. Stering122 an armed
121. 119 La. 134, 43 So. 983 (1907).
122. 205 La. 879, 887, 18 So. (2d) 327, 329 (1944).
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robbery case, the Louisiana Supreme Coijrt re-affirmed and ap-
plied the rule that it was without jurisdiction to review questions
of fact touching the guilt or innocence of the accused, "as to which
the jurors are the sole judges." Compare, however, the case of
State v. Bernard"13 where the facts were agreed upon and the
only question presented was whether the mere possession and
transportation of intoxicants constituted a violation of the local
prohibition ordinance. This question was held to be properly re-
viewable by the supreme court.
The supreme court's appellate jurisdiction is further limited
by the aforementioned constitutional provision to cases where
"the penalty of death, or imprisonment at hard labor may be
imposed; or where a fine exceeding Three Hundred Dollars or
imprisonment exceeding six months has been actually imposed."
In State v. Lejeune124 the defendant, who was charged with
criminal neglect of family" 5 excepted to the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the trial court. When the trial court overruled this plea, a
suspensive appeal was taken to the supreme court. That court
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Rogers,
speaking for the court, pointed out that the crime charged did not
carry a possible penalty of either death or imprisonment at hard
labor; and further stated that, as the case had not yet been tried
on its merits, no fine or'sentence giving the supreme court juris-
diction had actually been imposed.
State v. Rome126 held that an order by a judge of the juvenile
court for Orleans Parish, directing the payment of alimony for
support of a minor child, was appealable to the criminal district
court. Mr. Justice Fournet stressed the fact that Article 75 of the
Criminal Code 127 expressly authorizes an alimony decree, in lieu
of a judgment of fine or imprisonment, in cases where a defendant
has been found guilty of criminal neglect of family. 128 Such an
order was authorized in order to empower the court to force a
husband, within his ability to pay, to provide for the needs of his
wife or children in necessitous circumstances. An order directing
a defendant to pay more than he is financially able to pay, rea-
soned the court, is in direct violation of the purpose of this article:
123. 204 La. 844, 846, 16 So. (2d) 454, 455 (1943).
124. 205 La. 708, 18 So. (2d) 33 (1944).
125. Art. 74, La, Crim. Code of 1942.
126. 205 La. 1071, 18 So. (2d) 625 (1944).
127. Article 75 was copied substantially from the former Louisiana stat-
ute, Act 77, § 1, of 1932 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 9271. Alimony decrees
under this statute had been held to be appealable judgments. State v.
Walter, 170 La. 677, 129 So. 127 (1930).
128. Art. 74, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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Since the court is given full power to enforce such an order, it
should, if arbitrarily fixed, be appealable. It is important to note
that an appeal, such as the one which was ordered in State v.
Rome, would be taken direct to the Louisiana Supreme Court
after a 1944 amendment to Article VII, Section 96, of the Louisi-
ana Constitution. 12
Appeal-Basis and Scope
Article 502 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that
errors not patent on the face of the record are not available after
verdict unless a timely objection shall have been made at the trial
and a bill of exceptions taken. State v. Toney"30 applied the well
settled and logical corollary of that rule to the effect that. a "court
is charged with noticing ex proprio motu such nullities or defects
as may be apparent on the face of the record." In that case a ver-
dict and sentence for cruelty to juveniles 1" was annulled and set
aside on the grounds that the accusation had failed to state all
essential elements of the crime charged, and that the defendants
had been sentenced within less than twenty-four hours following
their conviction. 1 12 While no objection had been made during the
trial of the case, these defects were both apparent on the face of
the record and were, therefore, properly urged, for the first time,
on appeal.
The right of appeal in felony cases is expressly limited to
court rulings or judgments which have "finally disposed" of the
case.1 8 The question presented in State v. Shushan1 4 was whether
the state has a right to appeal from a judgment of the district
court ordering that a nolle prosequi be entered and the accused
parties discharged because the accusations had been pending for
longer than three years.' 85 The state had urged that the prescrip-
tive period had been interrupted by the defendant's absence from
the state while incarcerated in a federal prison in Texas. With-
out passing upon the validity of this claim, the supreme court
went directly to the issue at bar, i. e., did the state have a right to
129. Proposed by La. Act 322 of 1944.
130. 205 La. 451, 17 So. (2d) 624 (1944).
131. Art. 93, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
132. Art. 521, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928 provides "In all criminal
cases at least twenty-four hours shall elapse between conviction and sen-
tence, unless the accused waive the delay and ask for imposition of sentence
at once; . . ."
133. Art. 540, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
134. 204 La. 672, 16 So. (2d) 227 (1943).
135. The three year prescriptive period for prosecutions is set out in
Articles 8 and 9 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
appeal from the nolle prosequi order? The right of the state to
appeal from a judgment maintaining a plea of prescription was
well settled by a long line of Louisiana cases. -Defense counsel
sought to distinguish these decisions from the Shushan case
where, instead of filing a plea of prescription as is done when the
one year prescriptive period elapses without the bringing of a
formal accusation, the defendant had moved to have the court
order a nolle prosequi entered because there had been a three
year delay between the formal accusation and the actual trial.
Chief Justice O'Niell, who rendered a very scholarly majority
opinion, promptly rejected this attempted distinction. He pointed
out that both the one year period preceding the indictment and
the three year period preceding the trial had been consistently
treated as prescriptive periods. The judgment rendered in each
instance was a final judgment putting an end to the prosecution
and was, therefore appealable by the state.
Mr. Justice Fournet's brief dissenting opinion relied upon the
provision in Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that
where the district attorney fails to enter a nolle prosequi after
three. years have elapsed without prosecution, "the court may on
motion of defendant or his attorney cause such nolle prosequi to
be entered the same as if entered by the district attorney." (Italics
supplied.) Mr. Justice Fournet applied this clause literally and
reasoned that the district attorney should have no more right to
appeal where the judge caused a nolle prosequi to be entered than
where it was entered by the district attorney himself. Chief Jus-
tice O'Niell's majority opinion takes the practical approach that
the judge is actually causing the nolle prosequi to be entered
"against the protest," rather than on behalf of the district at-
torney. The court in such cases is clearly acting in its judicial
capacity and not as an agent of the prosecution. It follows, there-
fore, that the state's right of appeal is unimpaired.
Mr. Justice Higgins concurred in the court's holding that the
state should be accorded the right to present a nolle prosequi
order of the district judge to the supreme court for review, but
maintained that the appropriate remedy was through the more
expeditious procedure of the remedial writs of certiorari and pro-
hibition, under the supervisory jurisdiction of the supreme court.
In directing the district court to grant the state an appeal the
majority opinion stated, however, that "As a general rule this
court will not exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in a case where
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the party complaining has an adequate remedy by appeal."' 6 The
state had a material interest in demanding an appeal, rather than
the speedier remedy afforded by the supervisory writs. On appeal,
an appellant has the privilege of oral argument which is not per-
mitted in cases coming before the supreme court under its super-
visory jurisdiction.
Insanity at Time of Execution
Article 267 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure ex-
pressly provides that if a defendant is found, by reason of in-
sanity or other mental deficiency, to be unable to understand the
nature of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense,
he shall be committed to a proper institution and shall remain in
that institution until he regains his sanity and is capable of assist-
ing in the defense of his case. Where the issue of present insanity
is raised, the court is authorized to hold a hearing and appoint
disinterested experts who will testify along with other witnesses
on the question of sanity. The issue is then decided by the court.
It has been held that the appointment of a lunacy commission to
determine the mental condition of the prisoner and the holding
of a hearing on the sanity issue is a matter which addresses itself
to the sound discretion of the trial judge. His refusal to appoint
experts to examine the defendant is not reversible error where
the defense has merely made an assertion of insanity which is not
supported by trustworthy and substantial evidence providing a
reasonable ground for believing that the defendant is mentally
unbalanced.'8 7
The Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for the
case where a defendant, who has been convicted of a capital
crime, becomes insane pending his execution. The Louisiana Su-
preme Court has, however, relied upon a 1918 statute"3 8 which
recognized this type of insanity; and has declared that such su-
pervening insanity will suspend the execution of sentence."8 9 This
rule was reaffirmed in State v. Allen ° but the supreme court
136. 204 La. 672, 683, 16 So. (2d) 227, 231 (1943).
137. State v. Ridgway, 178 La. 606, 152 So. 306 (1934).
138. La. Act 261 of 1918 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3879].
139. See State v. Cannon, 185 La. 395, 402, 169 So. 446, 448 (1936). There
Is also authority at common law for the view that, even after sentence is
passed, a plea of insanity will suspend the execution of the sentence. See 1
Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1736) 35. The precise test of such insanity has
not been worked out by the courts, but it would appear to be the same as
that for insanity at the time of the trial.
140. 204 La. 513,.15 So. (2d) 870 (1943),
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held that the trial judge's refusal to appoint experts to examine
the defendant, who alleged present insanity as a stay to the ex-
ecution, was a proper exercise of judicial discretion. The court
held that the procedure set out in Article 267 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure was applicable to and governed all pleas of in-
sanity in criminal cases. It stressed the provision that the court's
obligation to appoint disinterested experts to inquire into the
sanity of the accused is limited to cases where it "has reasonable
ground to believe" that the defendant is insane or mentally de-
ficient. In the case at bar, each of the witnesses, upon whom de-
fense counsel had relied in urging present insanity, had stated
when questioned by the trial judge that he felt the prisoner was
perfectly sane.
II. TORTS
WEX S. MALONE*
Tort Liability Between Spouses
The problem of tort liability between husband and wife has
given rise to confusion and differences of opinion everywhere.
In common law jurisdictions the problem is stated simply as one
of responsibility: can the husband (or wife) be made liable to
the other spouse, or, does their marital relationship preclude tort
actions between themselves?' The Louisiana court apparently
has assumed that this question is to be answered in favor of
liability, but it has given the problem a different and difficult
twist by positing the issue in terms of community property. Both
spouses share in the benefits of the community, and successful
damage actions in favor of either of them usually accrue to the
community.2 For this reason it has been urged that a recovery
by one spouse against the insurer of the other for damages occa-
sioned by the latter's negligence will result in allowing the tor-
tious spouse, who participates in the community, to benefit by
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) § 99.
2. Apparently damages for personal injury to the wife resulting in loss
of earnings enter the community if she was living with her husband at the
time of the injury, while other damages for personal injury are her separate
property. See Kientz v. Charles Dennery, Inc., 17 So.(2d) 506 (La. App. 1944),
noted in (1944) 19 Tulane L. Rev. 141.
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